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Introduction
A firm’s original, or “legacy,” business plays a critical role in its functioning. As its oldest
operation, a firm’s legacy business is a repository of key organizational routines, which are the
product of accumulated knowledge and experiences and thereby guide corporate decision-making
(March and Simon 1958, Cyert and March 1963, Nelson and Winter 1982). To the extent that firms
grow and expand by building on their routines in a path-dependent manner, legacy businesses
should exhibit deep and extensive interdependencies with their remaining operations (Leonard-
Barton 1992, Teece et al. 1994). This is especially likely to be true when a firm diversifies to
leverage the routines embedded in its legacy business in related areas of its portfolio (Penrose 1959,
Chang 1996, Capron et al. 1998, Helfat and Eisenhardt 2004, Levinthal and Wu 2010).
At the same time, a firm’s legacy business is the unit whose importance is most likely to be over-
looked by its managers. A major consequence of the path-dependent development of organizational
routines is that the oldest routines will be the most tacit, and hence, the most likely to be taken
for granted by managers (March and Simon 1958, Nelson and Winter 1982, Leonard-Barton 1992).
Worse still, the very interdependencies emanating from a firm’s legacy business may be particularly
difficult for external constituents to assess, contributing to the undervaluation of that company in
the stock market (Lang and Stulz 1994, Berger and Ofek 1995, Litov et al. 2012). Thus, managers
might actually view their firm’s legacy business as problematic rather than valuable.
An important implication of this discussion is that “legacy divestitures,” the sale or spinoff
of a company’s legacy business, should be operationally costly to divesting firms in the short-
run. Just as an organization’s “technical core” must be protected from environmental fluctuations
(Thompson 1967), so too must a firm’s legacy business; any disruption of a firm’s legacy business
will ripple through the business units with which it is so deeply interdependent. Nevertheless,
managers might still choose to undertake legacy divestitures, simultaneously underestimating the
historical importance of their firms’ legacy businesses while overestimating the value of investors’
favorable response to legacy divestitures (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).
The implications of the above-described ideas are tested using an original dataset of 300 diver-
sified American companies, 56 of which divested their legacy businesses, between 1980 and 2000.
The stock market responds favorably to announcements of legacy divestitures, especially when they
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remove business units that operate in declining industries or when they are accompanied by corpo-
rate name changes that reflect the extent to which a firm is shifting away from its past. By contrast,
in the four years following the completion of legacy divestitures, the operating performance of firms
that divest their legacy businesses is lower than that of firms that retain comparable legacy units.
This performance gap is larger and persists for longer among firms that divest legacy businesses
operating in the same industry as other units in the divesting firms, as the interdependencies ema-
nating from the legacy business may be the greatest in that instance. After this four-year dip, the
operating performance of the divesting firms becomes equal to that of the retaining firms, and the
divesting firms do not experience an incremental improvement in profitability beyond that level.
Moreover, despite investors’ initially favorable response to legacy divestiture announcements, the
stock market performance of firms that undertake legacy divestitures ultimately begins to lag that
of firms that retain comparable legacy businesses.
One explanation for these findings can be inferred from the characteristics of the CEOs running
the divesting firms. New or recently-appointed CEOs should be the least likely to appreciate the
importance of their firms’ legacy businesses (Milliken and Lant 1991, Lant et al. 1992, Hambrick
et al. 1993), yet the most strongly motivated by investors’ expected favorable response to legacy
divestitures (March and Shapira 1992, Boyle and Shapira 2012). As a result, they are more likely to
be the managers who make flawed decisions in which they incur the short-run costs of, but realize
no long-run benefits from, legacy divestitures. Consistent with these points, newly-appointed CEOs
are significantly more likely to undertake legacy divestitures than their longer-tenured peers, and
the most operationally-costly legacy divestitures are undertaken in firms overseen by CEOs with
the shortest tenures in their firms.
In sum, this paper addresses the important phenomenon of legacy divestitures, shedding light
on the locus of tacit knowledge within organizations. The fact that legacy divestitures are so
operationally costly to the divesting firms provides evidence of how valuable the routines emanating
from a firm’s legacy business actually are. At the same time, the finding that managers, especially
those who are recently-appointed, still choose to divest these units illustrates how the routines
with the greatest value can come to be taken for granted within organizations. The key theoretical
contribution of this study is therefore to draw on evolutionary economics and the behavioral theory
of the firm to elucidate the origin and nature of the interdependencies that create value for diversified
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firms. This research also yields insights into why managers’ and investors’ expectations of their
firms’ future performance might diverge from the actual outcomes these companies experience, and
accordingly, how managers come to make corporate strategy decisions, even sub-optimal ones.
Theory and Hypotheses
Legacy Businesses
Organizational decision-making is guided by routines (March and Simon 1958, Cyert and March
1963), the “regular and predictable behavioral patterns of firms” (Nelson and Winter 1982: 14).
Just as an individual’s skills are rooted in his own knowledge and prior experiences, an organi-
zation’s routines are embodied in its memory (Nelson and Winter 1982: 99), the outcome of its
own knowledge and past experiences, as well as those of its individual members (Levitt and March
1988). As with the activities individuals perform, organizational routines are the building blocks of
core competences, or “what firms do well” (Teece 1988, Prahalad and Hamel 1990). However, just
as an individual may not be able to articulate the specific components of his skills (Polanyi 1958),
organizational routines are analogously tacit (March and Simon 1958, Nelson and Winter 1982).
Thus, organizational routines appear to be characterized by two key features: they exhibit a
strong degree of historical path dependence, yet they are tacit and frequently taken for granted
by organization members. Indeed, as Leonard-Barton (1992: 114) puts it, “Core capabilities are
part of the organization’s taken-for-granted reality, which is an accretion of decisions made over
time and events in corporate history.” Both of these traits are likely to manifest themselves quite
strongly in the “legacy businesses” of diversified firms.
A firm’s legacy unit is its original line of business, housing the organization’s oldest routines,
which makes it a key repository of knowledge. Because a firm develops its routines in a path-
dependent manner, applying the knowledge embedded in its legacy business to other parts of
the firm, the interdependencies between its legacy business and its remaining operations should
therefore be quite strong (Leonard-Barton 1992, Teece et al. 1994). At the same time, the fact
that the routines underpinning a firm’s legacy business are the oldest makes them the most tacit
and the most likely to be taken for granted, as the organization members in whom key knowledge
resides may depart and organizational memory might fade (Nelson and Winter 1982: 115).
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The juxtaposition of these two ideas yields the central tension considered in this paper: key
interdependencies in a diversified firm might be overlooked precisely because of their historical per-
vasiveness within the organization. The empirical context in which this tension will be investigated
in this paper is “legacy divestitures,” the sale or spinoff of a company’s legacy business.
Legacy Divestitures: Motives
Why might a manager choose to divest rather than retain his firm’s legacy business? As argued
above, the fact that a firm’s legacy business is its oldest implies that its managers will be highly
likely to take the interdependencies between that unit and the firm’s other segments for granted
(March and Simon 1958, Nelson and Winter 1982, Leonard-Barton 1992, Teece et al. 1994). At the
same time, this taken-for-grantedness might also make managers more likely to yield to external
pressures to divest these units, which may loom larger than the more tacit benefits associated with
the retention of their firms’ legacy businesses (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).
The external pressures driving managers to undertake legacy divestitures could, in fact, be quite
strong. Legacy businesses are frequently concentrated in weak or declining industries, consuming a
disproportionate amount of managerial time and attention (Harrigan 1980, Anand and Singh 1997)
while simultaneously exerting a drag on these firms’ stock market valuations (Lang and Stulz 1994,
Berger and Ofek 1995, Zuckerman 1999, Villalonga 2004a, 2004b, Litov et al. 2012). Interlake,
originally a steel company that diversified into the aerospace and automotive industries, provides
a good example of both of these problems. “‘For the last three years we’ve been trying to focus
on our businesses that are technology-driven,’ said Frederick C. Langenberg, chairman and CEO.
‘It’s difficult to manage businesses with two different emphases.’ Securities analysts said the spinoff
will make Interlake a more attractive investment. ‘The company’s good results from some of its
operations have often been offset by iron and steel,’ said Christopher Westcott, metals and mining
analyst at Tucker, Anthony & R.L. Day Inc.”1
Additionally, because legacy units are companies’ original businesses, corporate names fre-
quently derive from these operations. For example, General Cinema, which diversified into pub-
lishing, was originally a chain of movie theatres, and American Can, later in diversified financial
services, was originally a can manufacturer. As a result, external constituents, such as analysts or
1Source: “Interlake Inc. Sets Plan to Spin Off Iron, Steel Lines.” Wall Street Journal, 28 February 1986.
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shareholders, may continue to associate a firm with its legacy business even if that company has di-
versified into different domains. The discrepancy between a firm’s primary operations and those of
its legacy business might further contribute to that company’s undervaluation in the stock market.
For example, American Brands changed its name to Fortune Brands following the divestiture of its
legacy business, American Tobacco. With regard to this company’s name change, Ronald Lieber
of Fortune Magazine opined: “The rechristening itself was a good idea. Even though American
Brands had been out of the U.S. tobacco business for two years, its name is still associated with
tobacco... The new name should put an end to that source of confusion.”2
From a behavioral perspective, this undervaluation is a good example of a shortfall in a firm’s
performance below an aspiration level set by a reference group, representing a stimulus that might
prompt managers to change the firm’s strategy (March and Simon 1958, Greve 2003). Corporate
divestitures are an example of one such change. Divestitures improve managerial focus (Markides
1992, 1995, Comment and Jarrell 1995, John and Ofek 1995, Daley et al. 1997, Desai and Jain
1999, Berger and Ofek 1999), remove slow-growing or underperforming business units (Porter 1987,
Kaplan and Weisbach 1992, Hayward and Shimizu 2006, Shimizu 2007, Berry 2010), and clarify
external perceptions (Zuckerman 2000, Gilson et al. 2001, Bergh et al. 2008). These changes
should signal to investors that the divesting company’s long-term prospects will improve.
The last of these benefits may be pronounced when managers signal the extent to which they
are separating from their firm’s past by contemporaneously divesting their firm’s legacy business
and changing the company’s name (Akerlof 1970, Milgrom and Roberts 1986, Fombrun and Shanley
1990, Tadelis 1999, Gioia et al. 2000, Lee 2001). For example, Charles Shoemate, chairman and
CEO of CPC International, described his company’s name change and divestiture of its legacy
corn refining business as follows: “As CPC International, we already had the great brands, the
worldwide presence, and the track record to make us a top food industry competitor. Now, having
spun off our corn refining business, we are adding the advantage of total focus on branded foods.
We want to make sure that the investment community takes note of our new name, Bestfoods, and
our identity as the company that makes some of the world’s greatest and best-loved brands.”3
2Source: Lieber, Ronald B. “What? Fortune Makes Golf Balls? Studies in Corporate Nomenclature.” Fortune
Magazine, 9 December 1996.
3Source: “Bestfoods Celebrates Inauguration of Trading Under New Name; Stages ‘Bullish’ Event On Wall Street”
Business Wire, 5 January 1998.
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Investors typically respond favorably to the expected long-run benefits of divestitures, such that
the divesting firm’s stock market performance improves upon divestiture announcements (Miles and
Rosenfeld 1983, Schipper and Smith 1983, Markides 1992, Lang et al. 1995). Because investors will
expect similar long-term improvements in companies that undertake legacy divestitures, especially
when the divesting firms are highly diversified and when the divested units operate in declin-
ing industries or perform poorly, investors should also react favorably to announcements of these
transactions. This expected positive stock market response to legacy divestitures might therefore
constitute a significant external impetus driving managers to undertake these transactions rather
than to retain these units.
Hypothesis 1. Upon the announcement of a legacy divestiture, the stock market perfor-
mance of a firm that divests its legacy business will exceed that of a firm that retains a
comparable legacy business.
Certain managers may be more strongly motivated by investors’ expected positive response to
legacy divestitures than others. More specifically, CEOs often experience a great deal of pressure to
produce strong results in the early years of their tenures (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1990, Hambrick
and Fukutomi 1991, Ocasio 1994), potentially explaining why they are the most likely to implement
major organizational changes (Miller and Friesen 1980, Wiersema and Bantel 1992, Hambrick et al.
1993, Bigley and Wiersema 2002, Shimizu and Hitt 2005). As a result, a new or recently-appointed
CEO may feel the strongest urgency to divest his firm’s legacy business to gain the benefit of the
favorable stock market response that is expected to accompany that divestiture.
Put differently, new or recently-appointed CEOs are thought to be responsive to the “aspira-
tion point” set by the stock market valuations of comparable firms (March and Shapira 1992). Per
the above discussion, they may attempt to attain this aspiration point by divesting their firms’
legacy businesses. This is especially likely to be true when these units operate in industries that
face declining performance, as legacy divestitures eliminate legacy businesses from firms’ portfolios
altogether. By contrast, a CEO who has managed a firm for a longer period of time might instead
be more responsive to the “survival point” where the firm’s resources will be exhausted (March and
Shapira 1992). To meet this survival point, such CEOs will instead retain their firms’ legacy busi-
nesses and perhaps attempt to restructure internally, since these managers take a longer-term view
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of their organizations and are less beholden to the short-term pressures associated with “keeping
up” with their peers (Medvec et al. 1995, Boyle and Shapira 2012).
Similarly to the latter of these points, long-tenured CEOs may also display a disproportionate
emotional attachment to their firms’ legacy businesses given their long histories with those units, so
they may escalate their commitment to legacy businesses by opposing their divestitures (Staw 1981,
Katz 1982, Miller 1991, Hambrick et al. 1993). Long-tenured CEOs may also be more beholden to
the interests of individuals or coalitions within their firms, making it harder for them to implement
major changes like legacy divestitures (Cyert and March 1963, Miller and Friesen 1980, Ocasio
1994). By contrast, CEOs with short tenures in their firms should be less constrained by either of
these two organizational processes, making it easier for them to undertake legacy divestitures.
Taken together, these arguments suggest that in comparison to their longer-tenured counter-
parts, newer CEOs will be more likely to divest rather than retain their firms’ legacy businesses.
Hypothesis 2. The shorter the tenure of a company’s CEO, the more likely that manager
will be to divest rather than retain his firm’s legacy business.
Legacy Divestitures: Implications
The taken-for-grantedness of legacy businesses, in combination with external pressure from
investors favoring legacy divestitures, therefore helps to explain why managers (particularly those
who are relatively new to their firms) might choose to divest rather than retain these units. Again,
however, the very factor that might lead managers to minimize the importance of their firms’ legacy
businesses and thus choose to divest them – the path-dependent development and application of
tacit knowledge and organizational routines from a firm’s oldest business into the other units in its
portfolio – should simultaneously generate significant interdependencies between legacy businesses
and firms’ remaining operations (Leonard-Barton 1992, Teece et al. 1994).
Legacy divestitures remove business units that may be key repositories of organizational knowl-
edge from the divesting firms. In so doing, the interdependent routines that link legacy businesses
to these companies’ remaining operations will be broken. This implies that the functioning of these
companies will be disrupted, which should be reflected in reduced short-term operating performance
for these firms. By contrast, firms that retain their legacy businesses should experience no such
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disruption, and hence, no such operational costs.
This argument is similar to the idea that in an open systems paradigm, organizations take steps
to protect their “technical cores” from environmental fluctuations, as the mechanisms they put
in place “provide the organization with some self-control despite interdependence with the envi-
ronment” (Thompson 1967: 24). Analogously, a diversified firm’s retention of its legacy business
shields the rest of the organization from the fluctuations that would ripple through its interdepen-
dent business units were the legacy business – the root of these interdependencies – to be divested.
In sum, the foregoing discussion suggests that after managers undertake legacy divestitures,
their firms’ operating performance will fall short of that of firms that retain their legacy businesses.
Hypothesis 3. In the short-term following a legacy divestiture, the operating perfor-
mance of a firm that divests its legacy business will be lower than that of a firm that
retains a comparable legacy business.
Elaborating on this argument, the mechanism that underpins the above-hypothesized short-
term operational costs associated with legacy divestitures is the disruption of taken-for-granted yet
deeply-embedded routines that generate interdependencies between a firm’s legacy business and its
remaining operations.
It is possible to shed light on the manner in which legacy divestitures disrupt these interde-
pendencies by considering firms’ diversification paths. Firms diversify to utilize excess capacity
of their core competences (Penrose 1959, Teece 1982, Helfat and Eisenhardt 2004, Levinthal and
Wu 2010), such as shared capabilities or managerial talent, which are themselves rooted in orga-
nizational knowledge and routines. If a firm’s legacy business is in the same industry as others of
that company’s business segments, the routines and relevant knowledge these units share should be
more substantial than they are when the legacy unit operates in a different industry than others of
that firm’s business segments (Rumelt 1974, 1982, Montgomery and Wernerfelt 1988, Chatterjee
and Wernerfelt 1991, Montgomery and Hariharan 1991).
These points imply that interdependencies between a legacy business that is industrially-related
to one or more of its parent firm’s remaining business units will be more significant than they
are when a legacy business is industrially-unrelated to other business segments within that firm.
Consequently, to the extent that the mechanism underpinning the operational costs associated
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with legacy divestitures is indeed the disruption of deeply-rooted interdependencies, divestitures
of industrially-related legacy businesses should be more disruptive and hence, more operationally
costly to divesting firms than divestitures of industrially-unrelated legacy units (Bergh 1995).
Hypothesis 4. When a legacy business is industrially-related to other units in a firm,
the operational cost associated with divesting rather than retaining that business will
be greater than it is when a legacy business is industrially-unrelated to other units in a
company.
Along similar lines, considering the role of managerial tenure makes it possible to shed light
on the taken-for-grantedness of the routines embedded in firms’ legacy businesses that generate
interdependencies between these units and the remaining operations of the divesting companies.
Consistent with the discussion leading up to Hypothesis 2, the new or recently-appointed CEOs
who are the most likely to undertake legacy divestitures may be precisely the managers who will
take the importance of their firms’ legacy businesses for granted, and hence, underestimate the
magnitude of the operational costs associated with these transactions. A recently-appointed CEO
will not have enough history in the firm to understand the interdependencies between the legacy
business and the firm’s remaining operations (Milliken and Lant 1991, Lant et al. 1992), nor will
existing managers or employees within the company be able to explain the importance of these
interdependencies, given their tacit nature (March and Simon 1958, Nelson and Winter 1982).
Additionally, newer CEOs tend to have more diverse information sources than their longer-
tenured peers (Katz 1982, Finkelstein and Hambrick 1990, Miller 1991). While this kind of
information-processing capacity is generally viewed favorably (Hambrick and Fukutomi 1991, Ham-
brick et al. 1993), a short-tenured CEO’s reliance on external sources of information may limit,
rather than enhance, his ability to evaluate the importance of the firm’s legacy business, as an
accurate assessment of that unit’s importance to the firm might only be produced internally.
Thus, both of these points suggest that the most operationally-costly legacy divestitures will
be undertaken by firms overseen by newer CEOs, who are precisely the managers that will be most
likely to underestimate the importance of their firms’ legacy businesses.
Hypothesis 5. The shorter the tenure of a company’s CEO, the greater will be the oper-
ational cost associated with divesting rather than retaining that firm’s legacy business.
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Methods
Sample and Data
This paper analyzes firms’ decisions to divest versus retain their legacy businesses using a
sample of diversified American firms from 1980 to 2000, a period of intensive refocusing activity
in the United States (Markides 1992, 1995, Comment and Jarrell 1995). Diversified firms are of
interest in this study because they were the dominant organizational form during this time.
To generate the sample, a list of acquirers that bought targets with assets of at least $10M
between 1960 and 1979 was gathered from the Federal Trade Commission Statistical Report on
Mergers. Foreign companies and firms that only made a single acquisition during this period were
eliminated, leaving a sample of 300 American firms that were diversified by 1979. The rationale
for this sampling process is that the data sources commonly used to identify diversified firms
are relatively sparse in the early 1980s. Accordingly, conditioning the sample on firms that had
previously made multiple acquisitions is the only logical way to identify firms that were broadly
diversified by 1980. Moreover, this sample appears to be representative of the largest American
companies of that time: of these 300 firms, 243 of them were in the Fortune 500 ranking in 1980.
The identification of firms’ legacy businesses, and in turn, legacy divestitures, are two critical
steps in this paper’s data collection process. A legacy business is defined as the original business in
which a company operated at the time of its founding, and every company can have one and only
one legacy business. Under this definition, the legacy businesses of all 300 firms in the sample were
hand-collected using the International Directory of Company Histories and annual reports through
on-site library research, as no existing databases contain these data. I matched the qualitative
historical information I had collected on the industries in which each of these legacy units operated
to verbal descriptions of the industries to which SIC codes correspond, thereby assigning an SIC
code to each legacy business. To the extent possible, I confirmed these matches using the SIC codes
assigned to companies’ business segments in the Compustat segment-level database.
Having identified the legacy businesses of the companies in the sample, the next step was
to identify their legacy divestitures. To do this, detailed data, including industrial and financial
information about the divested units, on all divestitures made by each of these companies between
1980 and 2000 were gathered from the FTC Report, M&A Magazine, SDC Platinum, and CCH
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Capital Changes Reporter. I then identified the legacy divestitures in my sample by matching
the qualitative historical information I had collected on firms’ legacy businesses to the divestiture
data. For example, the legacy business of Esmark, one company in the sample, was meat-packing.
One of the divestitures undertaken by Esmark was a spinoff of SIPCO (Swift Independent Packing
Company), its meat-packing business. Accordingly, that spinoff was coded as a legacy divestiture.
Of the 300 firms in the sample, 56 were identified as having divested their legacy businesses.
The hypotheses in this paper make predictions comparing firms that divest their legacy businesses
to firms that retain them. Thus, for each of the 56 firms that divested their legacy businesses, in
the year of each legacy divestiture, I used a matched sample design, identifying a counterfactual
set of firms that retained legacy businesses operating in the same industry (defined by its two-digit
SIC code) as each of the divested legacy units. The advantage of this approach is that it allows me
to implicitly control for a wide range of environmental factors that might otherwise influence the
outcomes the divesting and non-divesting firms experience. For example, in 1994, Fortune Brands
divested its legacy tobacco business, American Tobacco, which operated in the industry defined
by SIC code 21. In that same year, three firms whose legacy businesses were also tobacco (Phillip
Morris, Loews Corporation, and RJR Nabisco) each continued operating those segments. Following
this process, I was able to identify 237 firms that retained legacy units operating in the same 2-digit
SIC codes as the 56 divested legacy businesses.
Data on these 293 firms were gathered within the 21-year period between 1980 and 2000.
I collected information on any name changes made by these companies from the CCH Capital
Changes Reporter, and data on the characteristics of the CEOs and boards of directors from the
Standard & Poors Register of Corporations, Directors, & Executives. Annual firm and segment
financial data were gathered from Compustat, and stock market data from CRSP.
Empirical Strategy
Hypothesis 1 predicts that investors will respond favorably to announcements of legacy di-
vestitures, such that the stock market performance of the divesting firms will exceed that of their
comparable non-divesting peers. I conduct an event study to test this prediction.
Hypotheses 2 through 5 indicate that the factors influencing the operational consequences of
legacy divestitures are closely intertwined with those driving managers’ decisions to divest their
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legacy businesses. Thus, it is necessary to account for the effects of non-random selection among
the firms that choose to divest rather than retain their legacy businesses.
Heckman selection models are the appropriate empirical strategy to do this. These two-stage
models account for the effects of non-random selection by representing in a first-stage regression
(equivalent to a standard logistic model) a firm’s decision to divest versus retain its legacy business
in a given year, and then estimating in a second-stage regression the relationship between that
divestiture and subsequent operating performance. To ensure identification of the model, it is
necessary to include instruments in the first-stage regression, variables that are correlated with
the decision to divest the legacy business but orthogonal to the unobserved errors in operating
performance in the second-stage regression.
Key Variables
Consistent with the foregoing discussion, the primary empirical consideration in this study is
a firm’s decision to divest versus retain its legacy business. As such, Legacy Divestiture is an
indicator variable taking the value one for firms that divest their legacy businesses4 and zero for
firms that retain these units, both measured in the divestiture year.
Legacy Divestiture is the dependent variable in the first-stage regression of the Heckman se-
lection model described above. Moreover, the predicted values of Legacy Divestiture from this
first-stage regression serve as the key independent variable in the second-stage performance re-
gression. Return on Sales (ROS) will be used to quantify the operational consequences of legacy
divestitures predicted in Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5.5
Two instruments are used to identify this Heckman selection model: 3-Year Sales Growth in
Legacy Industry (Colak and Whited 2007) and Major Exchange (Campa and Kedia 2002). 3-Year
Sales Growth in Legacy Industry is calculated as the compounded growth in sales of all single-
business firms operating in the industries in which each firm’s legacy business operated over the
three years leading up to each divestiture. Major Exchange is defined as an indicator variable taking
4No distinction is made between asset sales and spinoffs in the construction of this variable, and the results that
follow are not sensitive to the mode of divestiture.
5The results that follow are robust to the use of asset-based measures of operating performance such as ROA or
ROIC. However, ROS is a preferable representation because if the assets of legacy businesses were recorded at their
book values or were written down over time, those businesses would contribute less to the parent company’s assets
than they would to its profits, yielding a potential alternative explanation for any observed decline in ROA or ROIC.
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the value one if a firm’s stock is listed on the NASDAQ, NYSE, or AMEX stock exchanges. These
two variables appear to satisfy both of the requirements for appropriate instrumental variables.
First, beginning with 3-Year Sales Growth in Legacy Industry, firms divest business units, legacy
or not, when they have better opportunities elsewhere in their portfolios (Capron et al. 2001, Helfat
and Eisenhardt 2004, Berry 2010, Levinthal and Wu 2010). Thus, the slower-growing the industry
in which a legacy business operates, the more likely its parent company will be to divest that unit,
and vice versa, implying that 3-Year Sales Growth in Legacy Industry will be negatively correlated
with Legacy Divestiture. However, 3-Year Sales Growth in Legacy Industry will not be correlated
with ROS, in that the industry growth of a company’s legacy business prior to the divestiture will
not affect the firm’s overall performance after it has divested that business.
Second, following Campa and Kedia’s (2002) logic, Major Exchange should be positively cor-
related with a firm’s propensity to divest rather than retain its legacy business. A listing on one
of these three major stock exchanges makes a firm highly visible, thereby improving its ability to
attract buyers for any units it might want to divest, and therefore, its likelihood of undertaking a
legacy divestiture. However, Major Exchange will not be correlated with ROS, in that the exchange
on which a firm is listed is unlikely to systematically influence its internal operations.
Hypothesis 4 makes predictions regarding the operating performance consequences of firms
that divest legacy businesses that are industrially-related to other units within the divesting firms’
portfolios. I operationalize the concept of relatedness by constructing a continuous measure, Re-
latedness, which is defined as the percentage of a firm’s total business units that share a 3-digit
SIC code with the firm’s legacy business. Larger values of Relatedness therefore indicate that the
firm’s legacy business is more closely related to a greater proportion of the firm’s other operations.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that recently-appointed CEOs will be more likely than their longer-
tenured peers to divest legacy businesses, and Hypothesis 5 predicts that the operational costs of
legacy divestitures will be highest among firms whose CEOs have the shortest tenures. To test both
of these hypotheses, CEO Tenure is defined as the number of years a CEO has overseen a firm.
Control Variables
Several control variables are employed to represent the factors that might drive firms to divest
rather than retain their legacy businesses, as well as those that might influence the operating
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performance of these firms after they complete their legacy divestitures.
First, 3-Year Sales Growth in Primary Industry is calculated as the growth in sales of all firms
operating in the same primary SIC code as the companies in the sample, compounded over the
three years leading up to each divestiture. Because managers may undertake divestitures when
better opportunities exist in other areas of their firms’ portfolios than in their legacy units, this
variable should be positively correlated with both Legacy Divestiture and ROS.
% Unrelated Segments is defined as the percentage of a firm’s business segments that do not
share its primary SIC code, and Number of Acquisitions Made is a count of the number of ac-
quisitions a company made in a given year. Allocative choices may be most pronounced among
diversified or acquisitive firms, as these characteristics give firms more opportunties to improve
the distribution of resources in their portfolios. This suggests that both % Unrelated Segments
and Number of Acquisitions Made will be positively associated with Legacy Divestiture. However,
both unrelated diversification and an active acquisition program should adversely affect managers’
abilities to run their firms efficiently by dissipating their attention (Ocasio 1997), and may signal
the presence of empire-building or hubristic CEOs (Amihud and Lev 1981, Jensen 1986, Shleifer
and Vishny 1989), suggesting that % Unrelated Segments and Number of Acquisitions Made will
be negatively associated with ROS.
% Segments with Negative Cash Flow is defined as the percentage of a firm’s segments that have
negative earnings. The greater this proportion, the more likely that company will be to undertake
divestitures, whether to generate cash for their remaining operations or to focus the attention of
managers (John et al. 1992, Berger and Ofek 1999), implying a positive relationship between %
Segments with Negative Cash Flow and Legacy Divestiture. When a firm has a large share of
distressed businesses, its operating performance will be lower, suggesting that % Segments with
Negative Cash Flow will be negatively associated with ROS.
Name Change is an indicator variable that takes the value one in any year in which a company
changes its name. To the extent that managers change their companies’ names contemporaneously
with legacy divestitures, Name Change should be positively correlated with Legacy Divestiture. By
contrast, Name Change will not be associated with ROS, as corporate name changes should not
have direct operational consequences.
Relative Size is defined as the sales of a divested unit scaled by the sales of the parent firm. Di-
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vestitures of larger legacy businesses may facilitate more fundamental changes to the divesting firms
(Hoskisson and Johnson 1992, Bergh 1995), such that Relative Size should be positively correlated
with Legacy Divestiture. Larger divestitures may also result in more pronounced improvements in
managerial focus (Markides 1992), so Relative Size should be positively correlated with ROS.
Finally, ln(Total Assets) controls for the effects of the size of the divesting firm, Capex / PPE
measures its capital intensity and Debt / Value represents its leverage. Summary statistics and a
correlation matrix for the variables described in this subsection of the paper appear in Table 1.
———— Table 1 here ————
Results
Event Study
To test Hypothesis 1’s prediction of a more favorable investor response to legacy divestitures
than to comparable legacy retentions, I conducted an event study around the announcement dates
of each of the legacy divestitures in my sample.
I first identified the announcement dates of the legacy divestitures in my sample from Lexis-
Nexis. Then, I collected from CRSP the daily stock returns within 250-day estimation windows
[-800, -551] before these announcement dates both for the firms that divested their legacy businesses,
and for the counterfactual sets of firms that retained their legacy businesses. From there, I predicted
these firms’ normal returns from their daily stock returns and the stock market’s returns, and then
their abnormal returns within three-day event windows [-1, +1] surrounding the announcement
dates.6 Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are the cumulative sum of these abnormal returns.
The CAR of the 56 firms that divest their legacy businesses is +1.88%, statistically different
from zero at the 5% level of significance. The CAR of the firms that retain their legacy businesses is
-0.17%, and this average return is not statistically different from zero. Moreover, the CAR of firms
that divest their legacy businesses is statistically different, at the 1% level of significance, from that
of the firms that retain their legacy businesses on the divestitures’ announcement dates. These
6The estimation and event windows are the same as those used by Anand and Singh (1997), though the results
that follow are robust to the use of other windows.
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results provide support for the prediction that investors will react favorably to announcements of
legacy divestitures in expectation of long-term benefits to the divesting firms.
In addition, the CAR of firms that divest legacy businesses operating in industries whose average
sales growth declined in the year prior is +4.48%, statistically greater at the 5% level of significance
than the CAR of firms that retain legacy businesses operating in industries with negative sales
growth rates, -0.43%. By contrast, the CAR of firms that divest legacy businesses operating in
industries whose sales growth increased in the year prior is +1.35%, statistically greater at the 5%
level of significance than the CAR of firms that retain legacy businesses operating in industries
with positive sales growth rates, -0.11%. Finally, the CAR to divestitures of legacy businesses
operating in industries with declining (+4.48%) versus increasing (+1.35%) sales growth rates are
statistically different from one another at the 5% level of significance. These results indicate that
the pressure of declining prospects in the industry in which a firm’s legacy business operates may
be an important driver of the decision to divest rather than retain that unit.
Along similar lines, the CAR of firms that divest their legacy businesses and had changed their
corporate names in the year of or the three years preceding their legacy divestitures is +2.20%,
statistically greater at the 1% level of significance than the CAR of firms that retain their legacy
businesses and change their corporate names during this time period, -0.22%. By contrast, the CAR
of firms that undertake legacy divestitures and do not change their corporate names is +1.47%,
significantly larger, at the 5% level of significance, than the CAR of firms that retain their legacy
businesses and do not change their corporate names, +0.02%. Finally, the CAR to legacy divesti-
tures of firms that change their names (+2.20%) and firms that do not (+1.47%) are statistically
different from one another. These findings reveal that investors reward managers who undertake
legacy divestitures alongside changes that reflect the extent of their companies’ separations from
their pasts, providing further evidence that the external pressures driving managers to divest their
firms’ legacy businesses may indeed be quite strong.
Heckman Selection Model
To test Hypotheses 2 and 3, Table 2 presents the results of the above-described Heckman
selection model exploring the motives and implications of the legacy divestiture decision. Regression
[1] displays the first-stage regression analyzing the factors that drive a firm’s decision to divest
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its legacy business. Regression [2] presents the second-stage regression estimating the operating
performance consequences of legacy divestitures, conditional on the factors that drive firms to divest
these businesses in the first place.
———— Table 2 here ————
First-Stage Regression
The dependent variable in Regression [1] is Legacy Divestiture, and the instrumental variables
used to identify this two-stage Heckman model are 3-Year Sales Growth in Legacy Industry and
Major Exchange.
As predicted, the coefficient on 3-Year Sales Growth in Legacy Industry is negative and highly
significant, suggesting that when growth in a firm’s legacy industry is slow, that company is more
likely to divest than retain its legacy business. Figure 1 reinforces the point that the industries in
which divested legacy units operate are frequently slow-growing: starting in the fifth year prior to
legacy divestitures, the sales growth rate of the industries in which divested legacy units operate
begins to lag, to an increasingly large degree, the analogous growth rates of the industries in which
the remaining business units in the divesting firms operate.
———— Figure 1 here ————
Also as predicted, the coefficient on Major Exchange is positive and significant, indicating that
managers are more likely to divest than retain legacy businesses when their firms’ stock is listed
on one of the three major exchanges.
A Wald test that 3-Year Sales Growth in Legacy Industry and Major Exchange are not jointly
significantly different from zero is rejected at the 1% level of significance, suggesting that these
two instrumental variables are individually and collectively associated with a manager’s decision to
divest rather than to retain his firm’s legacy business. By contrast, the intuition that both 3-Year
Sales Growth in Legacy Industry and Major Exchange satisfy the exclusion restriction is supported
by the fact that neither variable has a significant coefficient when it is included in the second-stage
regression. Finally, a Sargan test, where the null hypothesis is that the identifying restrictions are
uncorrelated with the residuals in the model, is not rejected (Prob>X2 = 0.6879), indicating that
the identifying restrictions in this model are appropriate.
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The coefficients on the control variables in Regression [1] provide some insights into the moti-
vations for legacy divestitures. The positive and significant coefficient on Relatedness suggests that
firms are more likely to divest legacy businesses that are related to other units in their portfolios,
underscoring the taken-for-grantedness of the interdependencies emanating from legacy businesses.
Additionally, the positive and significant coefficient on Name Change reveals that managers adopt
new corporate names contemporaneously with legacy divestitures.
Most importantly, the coefficient on CEO Tenure is negative and significant, indicating that
firms run by CEOs who have short tenures are more likely to divest than to retain their legacy
businesses, providing support for Hypothesis 2. To shed additional light on this issue, Figure
2 depicts the incidence of CEO turnover in the years preceding legacy divestitures. This figure
indicates that the percentage of firms that appoint new CEOs increases dramatically in the years
immediately preceding legacy divestitures. By contrast, the incidence of CEO turnover is lower and
does not increase significantly among firms that retain their legacy businesses in the same years.
Further reinforcing this point is Figure 3, which reveals that within the subgroup of firms that
divest their legacy businesses, the number of companies that undertake legacy divestitures declines
in the tenure of their CEOs. These descriptive trends provide additional evidence that newer CEOs
tend to be the managers who undertake legacy divestitures.
———— Figures 2 and 3 here ————
Second-Stage Regression
The dependent variable in Regression [2] of Table 2 is Return on Sales (ROS), as measured in
the year following firms’ decisions to divest or retain their legacy businesses. The key independent
variable in this regression is Legacy Divestiture, as generated from the predicted values of the de-
pendent variable in Regression [1]. The coefficient on Legacy Divestiture is negative and significant
at 5%, suggesting that firms that divest their legacy businesses have lower operating performance in
the year after they decide to divest these units than do the firms that retain these units. This result
provides evidence in support of Hypothesis 3, showing that legacy divestitures are operationally
costly to the divesting firms following the completion of these transactions.7
7The mean ROS of the divesting firms is not significantly different from that of the retaining firms in any of the
five years leading up to the legacy divestiture/retention decision. This indicates that the above-described result is
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In Regression [2], the significant coefficient on lambda (the inverse Mills ratio) indicates that the
effects of non-random selection among the firms that choose to undertake legacy divestitures are
substantial, meaning that linear metholodogies such as ordinary least squares would produce biased
estimates of the effect of legacy divestitures on operating performance. A Hausman test of the null
hypothesis that the coefficients in an ordinary least squares regression of legacy divestitures on
operating performance are the same as those produced in the second-stage regression of the above-
described Heckman selection model is rejected (Prob>X2 = 0.0000). This provides further evidence
that a model that accounts for the effects of non-random selection is the appropriate specification.
The findings described to this point reveal that in the first year following the completion of
legacy divestitures, the operating performance of firms that divest their legacy businesses is lower
than that of firms that retain them. However, it remains to investigate the length of time for which
the gap in the profitability of these two groups of firms persists. Accordingly, the first column of
Table 3 presents the coefficients on Legacy Divestiture, derived from the second-stage regressions
measuring ROS in the second through ninth years following the legacy divestiture decision.
———— Table 3 here ————
The coefficients on Legacy Divestiture are negative and significant when ROS is measured in the
first, second, third and fourth year following the legacy divestiture decision.8 While the coefficients
on this variable remain negative in the fifth through ninth year following this decision, they are
not significant. These results suggest that, relative to the profitability of firms that retain their
legacy businesses, firms that divest their legacy businesses suffer a four-year dip in their operating
performance, providing further support for Hypothesis 3. In the years thereafter, while there
is no significant difference in the profitability of these two groups of companies, the operating
performance of the divesting firms does not improve beyond its pre-divestiture levels, suggesting
that legacy divestitures are a costly strategy, with no offsetting long-run benefits.
This finding of a four-year dip in the operating performance of firms that undertake legacy
not attributable to ex ante differences between the performance of the divesting and retaining firms, reinforcing the
validity of the matched sample design employed in this paper.
8The fact that the dip in operating performance is a short-term effect, lasting four years but not longer, could be
attributable either to managers taking steps to improve their firms’ performance after a few years of weak results,
or to the effects of firm activity in the intervening time period. These two possibilities are respectively supported by
the facts that the coefficients on the Legacy Divestiture variable become less negative and the standard errors on this
variable increase as more time elapses following the legacy divestiture decision.
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divestitures (relative to the performance of firms that retain their legacy businesses) creates an
interesting contrast to the earlier result of a favorable stock market reaction to firms that divest
rather than retain their legacy businesses. If the stock market is efficient and investors are rational,
the discrepancy between these two results must ultimately be resolved, with the stock price of the
divesting firms declining as their operating performance deteriorates.
Figure 4 presents descriptive data that speaks to this issue. Consistent with the premise of
the matched sample design employed in this paper, the average Tobin’s q (a long-term measure of
stock market performance) of firms that divest and retain their legacy businesses is not statistically
different in the five years leading up to, the year of, or the year immediately following the legacy
divestiture decision. However, starting in the second year following the legacy divestiture decision,
the average Tobin’s q of firms that divest their legacy businesses becomes significantly smaller
than that of firms that retain their legacy businesses, and remains that way through the fifth year
following the legacy divestiture decision.9 This result indicates that investors ultimately do respond
to the negative operating performance experienced by firms that divest their legacy businesses and
price it into their long-term stock market performance (Benner and Ranganathan 2013).
———— Figure 4 here ————
Relatedness
Having established that on average, the relationship between legacy divestitures and short-
term operating performance is negative, it remains to consider the mechanism hypothesized to
underpin this result. Hypothesis 4 predicts that the magnitude of the operational disruption of
legacy divestitures will be greater for firms that divest legacy businesses that operate in the same
industries as other segments in their portfolios than for firms that divest unrelated legacy units.
Testing this hypothesis requires the construction of indicator variables representing related and
unrelated legacy divestitures. These new constructs become the dependent variable in the first-
stage regressions of the Heckman selection models developed thus far, and their predicted values are
the key independent variable in these models’ second-stage regressions. I create these new variables
in two ways.
9While not depicted in this figure, the average Tobin’s q of the two groups of firms is not statistically different
after the fifth year following the legacy divestiture decision.
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First, I define Related Legacy Divestiture as an indicator variable taking the value one when
Legacy Divestiture takes the value one and the 3-digit SIC code of the firm’s legacy business is
the same as that of at least one of its other business segments, representing divestitures of related
legacy businesses. Related Legacy Divestiture takes the value zero when Legacy Divestiture takes
the value zero and the firm’s legacy business shares its 3-digit SIC code with at least one other of
its business segments, representing retentions of related legacy businesses. Analogously, Unrelated
Legacy Divestiture is an indicator variable taking the value one when Legacy Divestiture takes the
value one and the 3-digit SIC code of the firm’s legacy business is not the same as those of any
of its other business segments, representing divestitures of unrelated legacy businesses. Unrelated
Legacy Divestiture takes the value zero when Legacy Divestiture takes the value zero and there is
no overlap in the 3-digit SIC codes of a firm’s legacy business and those of any of its other business
segments, representing retentions of unrelated legacy businesses.
The second and third columns of Table 3 indicate that the coefficients on Related Legacy
Divestiture are negative and significant when ROS is measured in the first five years following the
divestiture of a related legacy business, though they lose their significance thereafter. By contrast,
the coefficients on Unrelated Legacy Divestiture are negative, though never statistically significant.
Second, I take the definition of relatedness a step further by operationalizing it as the cir-
cumstance in which the industry of the firm’s legacy business is the same as the firm’s primary
industry. Thus, Primary Industry Legacy Divestiture is an indicator variable taking the value one
when Legacy Divestiture takes the value one and the 3-digit SIC code of the firm’s legacy business
is the same as the company’s primary 3-digit SIC code. Primary Industry Legacy Divestiture takes
the value zero when Legacy Divestiture takes the value zero and the 3-digit SIC code of the firm’s
legacy business is the same as the company’s primary 3-digit SIC code. Not Primary Industry
Legacy Divestiture takes the value one when Legacy Divestiture takes the value one and the 3-digit
SIC code of the firm’s legacy business is not the same as that of its primary industry. Not Primary
Industry Legacy Divestiture takes the value zero when Legacy Divestiture takes the value zero and
the 3-digit SIC codes of a firm’s legacy business and its primary industry differ.
The fourth and fifth columns of Table 3 show that the coefficients on Primary Industry Legacy
Divestiture are negative and significant when ROS is measured in the first five years after the
divestiture of a legacy business operating in the divesting firm’s primary industry. While the
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coefficients on Not Primary Industry Legacy Divestiture are all negative, none are significant.
Two key points emerge from the results presented in the final four columns of Table 3. First,
divestitures of related legacy businesses appear to be the more operationally-costly type of legacy
divestitures, especially when the divested legacy business operates in the divesting firm’s primary
industry. Second, the operational costs associated with related legacy divestitures persist for longer
than did the average effect of divestitures of related and unrelated legacy businesses together.
These findings all support Hypothesis 4, showing that when the interdependencies resulting from
industrial relatedness between a firm’s legacy business and its remaining operations are disrupted,
the company’s operating performance suffers.
CEO Tenure
Hypothesis 5 predicts that the operational costs of legacy divestitures will be highest when CEOs
with shorter tenures in the divesting firms undertake these transactions. Table 4 provides evidence
in support of this prediction by presenting the coefficients on Legacy Divestiture, disaggregated
according to the tenures of the CEOs undertaking the divestitures.
———— Table 4 here ————
More specifically, these disaggregated variables are created by interacting Legacy Divestiture
with different tranches of the CEO Tenure variable, with cutoffs ranging from three to ten years.10
For example, the coefficient on Legacy Divestiture in the first column of the first block in Table
4 represents the marginal effect of legacy divestitures on ROS in firms overseen by CEOs with
tenures of three years or less. By contrast, the coefficient in the second column of the first block
in Table 4 represents the marginal effect of legacy divestitures on ROS in firms overseen by CEOs
with tenures of more than three years.
Consistent with Hypothesis 5, the coefficients on Legacy Divestiture are negative and significant
when firms that divest their legacy units are overseen by CEOs with short tenures (six years or
less),11 as represented by the coefficients in the first column of Table 4. By contrast, the coefficients
10The mean tenure of the CEOs in the sample in the year of the legacy divestiture/retention decision is 13 years.
The tenth percentile is five years, the fifth percentile is four years, and the first percentile is two years.
11There are not enough observations of firms managed by CEOs with tenures of two years or less that divest their
legacy businesses to generate meaningful coefficient estimates.
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on Legacy Divestiture are negative, though not significant, when the firms that undertake legacy
divestitures are managed by CEOs with longer tenures, as indicated in the second column of Table
4. The third column reveals that the two coefficients in each pair are statistically different from
one another for CEOs with shorter tenures. These findings support the behavioral prediction that
because newer CEOs are the most likely to take for granted the importance of their firms’ legacy
businesses, and thus, the most eager to divest these units despite their value, the firms they oversee
will experience the largest operational costs from these legacy divestitures.
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper has investigated the factors that motivate managers to undertake legacy divestitures,
and the consequences of these transactions. The central idea on which this study builds is that
a diversified firm’s legacy business is its oldest operation, such that the routines and knowledge
embedded in it are applied in a path-dependent manner to the other units within that company.
While the path-dependent development and application of routines make a firm’s legacy business
highly interdependent with that company’s remaining operations, the age and historical pervasive-
ness of these routines simultaneously make them the most tacit, leading managers to overlook or
take for granted the importance of their firm’s legacy business.
The taken-for-grantedness of legacy businesses, in combination with strong external pressure
favoring divestitures of these units, help explain why managers might undertake legacy divesti-
tures in the first place. The CEOs with the shortest tenures in their firms appear to be the most
likely to undertake legacy divestitures. The fact that these individuals do not have much history
within a divesting firm makes them the least likely to understand the importance of that company’s
legacy business. Moreover, these managers may be the most susceptible to external pressure from
investors to undertake legacy divestitures, as these units are often concentrated in declining indus-
tries, exerting a drag on their parent companies’ stock market performance. Consistent with this
point, investors respond favorably to announcements of legacy divestitures, especially when these
transactions remove legacy businesses that operate in declining industries and when they occur
alongside corporate name changes that are intended to convey the extent to which the divesting
firm is separating its future from its past.
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Despite the strong forces driving managers to undertake legacy divestitures, the significant
interdependencies that are likely to exist between a firm’s legacy business and its remaining oper-
ations imply that the divestiture of that unit will be costly to the company. Consistent with this
prediction, the operating performance of firms that divest their legacy businesses is found to be
lower in the four years following the completion of these transactions than that of firms that retain
their legacy businesses during the same time period. There is no statistical difference in the operat-
ing performance of these two groups of companies in the years thereafter, and the post-divestiture
profitability of the firms that undertake legacy divestitures never exceeds that of the companies
that retain their legacy businesses, revealing that these transactions do not impart any kind of
offsetting operational improvement to counteract these costs. Thus, while the decision to divest
a legacy business can be characterized as a choice between growth and profitability, this tradeoff
does not work out favorably for the divesting firms.
Taken together, the results in this work make several contributions to management theory.
First, this study uses insights from the behavioral theory of the firm and evolutionary economics
to shed light on the nature and value of the interdependencies that exist within diversified firms. The
findings in this research suggest that, due to path-dependence in the development and application
of routines and knowledge, a firm’s oldest business exhibits the deepest and most extensive linkages
with its remaining units, such that the disruption of these interdependencies is operationally costly
to the divesting firm. Reinforcing the idea that the value of a firm’s legacy business may derive
from the deep interdependencies it has with other units in that company’s portfolio, the magnitude
of the gap in operating performance between the divesting and non-divesting firms is larger and
persists for longer when a firm divests a legacy business that operates in its primary industry or
in the same industry as others of its business units. By investigating what happens when the key
interdependencies emerging from a firm’s legacy business are broken, it is possible to draw inferences
about the value those shared routines and capabilities brought to the diversified firm in the first
place. Consistent with the implication of Teece et al.’s (1994) work, these interdependencies are
quite valuable. This suggests that the order in which a firm diversifies is critically important, and
it is costly for a firm to try to escape its history.
Second, this study illustrates how a temporary inconsistency between the operating and stock
market performance of firms that undertake legacy divestitures could emerge. In the short-term,
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firms that divest their legacy businesses experience higher stock market performance but lower
operating performance than their counterparts that retain their legacy businesses. This provides
evidence of a heuristic bias among managers and investors. Managers appear to overestimate the
importance of external pressures driving them to divest legacy units, yet they underestimate the
significance of the costs of legacy divestitures, since they take for granted the importance of the
interdependencies that make legacy businesses valuable. Similarly, investors also “get it wrong” by
reacting favorably to announcements of legacy divestitures, as external constituents are even less
likely than internal constituents to appreciate the importance of these legacy businesses.
However, consistent with Benner and Ranganathan (2013), who demonstrate how divergent
investor beliefs resolve themselves (albeit slowly) as information about a new strategy is revealed,
the discrepancy between the operating and stock market performance of firms that undertake legacy
divestitures is ultimately reconciled as the long-term stock market performance of the divesting firms
begins declining alongside their operating performance. An interesting direction for future research
might be to consider the outcomes experienced by the divesting firms in the very long-term, to the
extent that the short-term operational disruption and consequent negative investor response might
adversely influence the survival prospects of these companies.
Third, the research in this paper extends upper echelons theory using insights from the be-
havioral theory of the firm about learning and routines to show how managers with less tenure
in their organizations may fall into a trap that leads them to undervalue their firms’ legacy busi-
nesses. In this paper, new and recently-appointed CEOs are significantly more likely to undertake
legacy divestitures than are their longer-tenured counterparts, and the most operationally-costly
legacy divestitures are undertaken in firms managed by the CEOs with the shortest tenures in their
organizations.
These findings help reconcile the above-described divergence between the stock market and op-
erational consequences of legacy divestitures: whereas the responsiveness of short-tenured managers
to the aspiration point set by comparable peers may push them to undertake legacy divestitures
to attain the benefits of a favorable stock market reaction despite the operational costs of these
transactions, the responsiveness of long-tenured managers to the survival point internal to their
organizations might instead lead them to retain their legacy businesses, thereby foregoing the fa-
vorable stock market reaction to legacy divestitures but also avoiding their operational costs. Thus,
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the CEOs with little or no personal history in their firms are, paradoxically, precisely the managers
who are the most likely to undertake a costly course of action with respect to the business units
with the most history in these organizations. This result stands in contrast to the upper echelons
literature, which has touted the ability of new CEOs to enable their firms to overcome inertia, and
implies that it is important for managers to respect their firms’ corporate antecedents in order to
attain the strategic benefits of inertia.
Additionally, the insight that short-tenured managers undertake the most costly legacy divesti-
tures provides a useful counterpoint to the agency-theoretic view that self-serving managers make
bad decisions. In this paper, problems arise when value-maximizing managers try to do right by
their firms (by implementing strategies to reduce undervaluation), but make mistakes because they
overlook the importance of key factors affected by their strategies (the historical roots of a business
and the interdependencies emerging therefrom). Thus, agency theory is not the only means of
understanding managerial mistakes, and behavioral theory contributes to this effort as well.
Finally, beyond these theoretical contributions, this study makes an important empirical con-
tribution as well. This paper identifies legacy divestitures as an independent and sizeable class of
corporate divestitures, making these transactions a useful phenomenon with which to shed light
on the internal functioning of diversified firms and the importance of corporate history in shaping
firms’ core competences. Future research should consider the role history plays in the corporate
strategy decisions managers make, as well as its performance implications for diversified firms.
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Figure 1: Sales growth rates of legacy businesses versus remaining units in divesting firms
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Figure 2: Incidence of CEO turnover around legacy divestitures/retentions
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Figure 3: Incidence of legacy divestitures by CEO tenure
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Figure 4: Long-term stock market performance around legacy divestitures/retentions
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Table 2: Operating performance one year after legacy divestiture, Heckman selection model
Model: First-Stage Second-Stage
Dependent Variable: Legacy Divestiture ROS
Legacy Divestiture -1.430**
(0.585)
3-Year Sales Growth in Legacy Industry -1.234***
(0.465)
Major Exchange 1.207**
(0.609)
Relatedness 0.465** -0.252
(0.211) (0.658)
CEO Tenure -0.032** -0.003
(0.014) (0.004)
3-Year Sales Growth in Primary Industry 0.470 0.006
(0.292) (0.107)
% Unrelated Segments 0.475 -0.192
(0.444) (0.134)
Number of Acquisitions Made -0.083 -0.145**
(0.248) (0.060)
% Segments with Negative CF -0.315 -0.667**
(1.013) (0.312)
Name Change 0.888** 0.272
(0.440) (0.216)
Relative Size 2.453*** 0.778
(0.640) (0.536)
ln(Total Assets) -0.054 0.024
(0.093) (0.028)
Capex / PPE 3.031*** 0.831**
(1.091) (0.423)
Debt / Value 1.275* -2.307***
(0.657) (0.226)
Constant -2.447** -1.823***
(1.194) (0.309)
lambda 0.631**
(0.287)
Observations 293 293
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Effects on ROS of legacy divestitures undertaken by CEOs of different tenures
Dependent Variable: Return on Sales Wald Test
CEO Tenure: ≤ 3 Years > 3 Years X2(1)
Legacy Divestiture -1.877*** -0.622 6.73***
(0.557) (0.511)
CEO Tenure: ≤ 4 Years > 4 Years X2(1)
Legacy Divestiture -1.910*** -0.698 6.76***
(0.384) (0.518)
CEO Tenure: ≤ 5 Years > 5 Years X2(1)
Legacy Divestiture -1.410** -0.594 6.32**
(0.722) (0.484)
CEO Tenure: ≤ 6 Years > 6 Years X2(1)
Legacy Divestiture -2.045** -0.575 6.54**
(0.909) (0.474)
CEO Tenure: ≤ 7 Years > 7 Years X2(1)
Legacy Divestiture -1.171 -0.622 0.93
(0.984) (0.511)
CEO Tenure: ≤ 8 Years > 8 Years X2(1)
Legacy Divestiture -1.156 -0.641 0.81
(0.795) (0.516)
CEO Tenure: ≤ 9 Years > 9 Years X2(1)
Legacy Divestiture -0.956 -0.644 0.76
(0.794) (0.502)
CEO Tenure: ≤ 10 Years > 10 Years X2(1)
Legacy Divestiture -0.341 -0.282 0.08
(0.482) (0.442)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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